Jack Nelson Jones Professional Association

February 8-14, 2016

Madden v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 45 (January 27, 2016)

This appeal comes from the Jackson County Circuit Court, Honorable Harold S. Erwin presiding. This case concerns a products liability claim against a supplier.

Eileen Madden and her now-deceased husband, Norman, bought a used 1998 Mercedes-Benz ML320 automobile from Little Rock Wholesale (LRW) in October 2004. The Bill of Sale indicated that they bought the vehicle “as is.” Prior to the purchase, the vehicle’s seatbelt buckle was the subject of a recall campaign because the seatbelt buckle tabs in these vehicles had a potential defect that could cause it to unlatch. Pursuant to the recall, Madden’s vehicle was inspected by Scott Reid in August 2003; he determined that the defect was not present. On March, 20 2007, Madden had an automobile collision with Christopher Taylor; she was ejected from the vehicle and seriously injured. Although Madden maintained that she habitually wore her seatbelt—and there was evidence indicating that her injuries were consistent with seatbelt usage—the police report from the collision indicated that she was not wearing a seatbelt. Madden spent many weeks receiving acute care for her injuries. During that time, the vehicle was determined to be a total loss, and Norman transferred the title of the vehicle to their insurance carrier on April 17, 2007. The insurance carrier scrapped and sold the vehicle without an inspection of the vehicle or its seatbelt for potential defects. After filing her initial complaint against Taylor for negligence, Madden amended her complaint to add Mercedes-Benz, TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. (TRW) (the manufacturer of the seatbelt), and LRW. She alleged her vehicle’s seatbelt was defective, the defect caused her seatbelt to become unlatched during the collision, and the defect proximately caused her injuries.

On October 15, 2012, Mercedes and TRW filed a joint motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Madden’s claims against them. They argued that the presence of a defect was a necessary element of each of her claims and that she failed to offer evidence of a defect in the seatbelt attributable to either of them. The circuit court granted Mercedes and TRW’s joint motion on June 24, 2014. LRW, likewise filed a motion for summary judgment granted by the circuit court. Madden appealed, and the following summary concerns the products liability claim against Mercedes and TRW.

On appeal, the Court explained that to prevail in a products liability case against a supplier, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving both (1) that the product was defective when it left the defendant’s control such that it was unreasonably dangerous and (2) that the defect caused the injury. The key question here is whether the seatbelt was defective when it left the control of Mercedes and TRW. The Court pointed out, however, that the facts of this case made it difficult to establish a factual dispute on the presence of a defect. The vehicle and its seatbelt were no longer available, and they were never inspected by an expert for any party. In the absence of direct proof that the product was defective because of a manufacturing flaw, Arkansas law required that Madden offer “substantial evidence” that negated other possible causes of failure of the product not attributable to Mercedes and TRW. Substantial evidence, the Court explained, is that which is of sufficient force and character that it would compel a conclusion one way or another. It must force or induce the mind to pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Madden was not required to eliminate all other possibilities—and she did not need to prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt—but she did need to present evidence from which a jury could conclude that it was more probable than not that this occurred.

Mercedes and TRW established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment because: the police report indicated Madden was not wearing her seatbelt; the vehicle was no longer available for inspection; and Scott Reid’s inspection of the vehicle found no defect. Most notably, the Court added, Mercedes and TRW relied on Madden’s own expert’s testimony to negate the presence of a defect attributable to them. Specifically, Madden’s expert, Gerald Barnett, testified that he would have to be “a psychic” to determine whether a seatbelt-latch problem existed when the vehicle was new or whether it was introduced later.

Because Mercedes and TRW’s joint motion for summary judgment established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the Court explained that the burden shifted to Madden to present some evidence of a defect attributable to Mercedes and TRW. Madden clearly called into question whether she was wearing her seatbelt during the collision because: she testified it was her habit to wear her seatbelt; and Dr. Frank Peretti, associate medical examiner at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, stated her injuries were consistent with seatbelt usage. Nevertheless, evidence that Madden’s seatbelt came unlatched during the collision does not, in and of itself, equate to evidence of a defect when the seatbelt was manufactured or supplied. In an attempt to question the functionality of her seatbelt, Madden highlighted the recall campaign for defective seatbelts that included her vehicle. The Court noted, however, that the recall itself was insufficient evidence of a defect in the seatbelt. Madden also pointed out that, while Reid’s recall inspection on the vehicle found no defect present, he dedicated only a short amount of time to the inspection. However, Madden offered no evidence that his inspection was inadequate or improper. Barnett even testified that he had the opinion that Reid performed the buckle inspection properly. In addition, Barnett said through deposition testimony that he thought her seatbelt became unlatched during the collision and that a defect present at manufacturing could appear long after a seatbelt left a supplier’s control. He attempted to negate the possibility that some action by Madden or another third party could have caused the seatbelt to unlatch when he testified that a foreign object or spill would have caused the seatbelt to not latch at all, but he later testified that a foreign object or spilled drink could cause a seatbelt to merely latch improperly. Barnett also said he would need to examine the seatbelt to do more than speculate as to the cause of the belt unlatching.

The Court determined that Madden failed to place a material fact on an element of her claim in dispute. Even if she had worn her seatbelt during the collision and the seatbelt unlatched because of a defect, the Court pointed out that she could not establish that this defect was present when it left Mercedes and TRW’s control. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. Affirmed.