Jack Nelson Jones Professional Association
December 11-17, 2017
Barnett v. Cleghorn, 2017 Ark. App. 641 (November 29, 2017)
This appeal comes from the Grant County Circuit Court, honorable Chris E. Williams presiding. This case concerns causation in a negligence claim.
On August 17, 2011, Morgan Barnett was stopped on Highway 270 and waiting on westbound traffic to pass in order to make a left turn onto Keg Mill Road. A truck driven by Damon Cleghorn and owned by his employer, Purcell Tire & Rubber Company, was traveling behind Barnett with large truck tires in the bed. Dustin Golden was driving behind Cleghorn in the same direction. Cleghorn maneuvered around Barnett on the shoulder and did not collide with her vehicle. Golden, however, collided with Barnett’s car and also with Cleghorn’s truck. Barnett’s car was pushed into oncoming traffic and was struck.
Barnett, and her parents (collectively, the Barnetts) alleged that Cleghorn was speeding and that he failed to keep a proper lookout and notice that Barnett had slowed to make a turn. They claimed that his attempt to pass Barnett on the right shoulder caused the chain reaction of collisions. The Barnetts claimed that Cleghorn’s negligence was the proximate cause of their damages and that Purcell was liable under respondeat superior.
Cleghorn and Purcell contended Clehorn did not strike Barnett’s car and that an accident reconstructionist, R. Torrey Roberts, determined Golden has time to react to Cleghorn’s slowing and passing Barnett. Thus, the argued Cleghorn’s actions were not the proximate cause. Robert. The Barnetts’ reconstructionist, Chuck Atkinson, opined that Cleghorn’s maneuver to pass Barnett’s stopped car without sufficient warning of his intention did not provide Golden sufficient time and distance to avoid the collision.
Following a hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Cleghorn and Purcell, and the Barnetts ultimately appealed.
On appeal, the Barnetts contended that factual issues remained as to whether Cleghorn proximately caused the accident by following too closely or by driving inattentively or too fast and thereby created the danger that caused Golden to strike Barnett. Pointing to their expert’s report, the Barnetts claimed that a jury could find that Cleghorn’s truck obliterated Golden’s view of Barnett’s car and that Cleghorn’s last-minute evasive action left insufficient time for Golden to stop and avoid a collision. The Court explained that to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant breached a standard of care, that damages were sustained, and that the defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of those damages. “Proximate cause” is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. According to the Court, proximate causation is usually an issue for the jury to decide, and when there is evidence to establish a causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage, it is proper for the case to go to the jury. It becomes a question of law only if reasonable minds could not differ.
The Barnetts argued that even if Golden was also negligent, this did not absolve Cleghorn of liability unless Golden’s actions were an independent, intervening cause. The Court stated that proximate cause is the efficient and responsible cause, but it need not be the last or nearest one. The mere fact that other causes intervene between the original act of negligence and the injury for which recovery is sought is not sufficient to relieve the original actor of liability, if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the original negligent act or omission and is such as might reasonably have been foreseen as probable. The original act or omission is not eliminated as a proximate cause by an intervening cause unless the latter is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury. The intervening cause, the Court continued, must be such that the injury would not have been suffered except for the act, conduct or effect of the intervening agent totally independent of the acts or omission constituting the primary negligence. An intervening act that is a normal response to the stimulus of a situation created by the actor’s negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about. According to the Court, the Barnetts’ claim that the questions of whether Cleghorn’s actions were concurrently negligent and a proximate cause of the accident were issues for the jury to decide.
The Court agreed with the Barnetts that a question of fact remained regarding whether Golden’s actions were an independent, intervening cause or whether they were a normal response to the situation created by Cleghorn’s negligence. Atkinson’s report stated that the total stopping distance for Golden’s truck was 275 feet, as opposed to the braking distance of 150 feet cited by Roberts. Atkinson opined that Golden would have been 225 feet from the collision when he could first see Barnett stopped attempting a left turn. Atkinson said that there were indications that Cleghorn did not appreciate Barnett’s stopped car until he had to make an evasive maneuver to avoid her, and this created the situation causing Golden to have insufficient time to avoid the collision. The fact that Cleghorn successfully maneuvered around Barnett was not determinative given the evidence that he failed to stop in the normal course of traffic and that his actions, according to one expert, caused Golden to have insufficient time to react.
The Court concluded that the evidence presented demonstrated the existence of a material issue of fact regarding causation. Summary judgment is not designed for assessing the probative strength of conflicting proof or expert opinions. Rather, that process is correctly done by the trier of fact after a trial on the merits. The Court thus held that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. Reversed and remanded.