Jack Nelson Jons Professional Association

April 10-16, 2017

Johnson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2017 Ark. App. 147 (March 8, 2017)

 

This appeal comes from the Mississippi County Circuit Court, Chickasawba District, honorable Brent Davis presiding. This case concerns whether a school board’s exclusive right to contract on behalf of the school district can be overridden by the conduct of a single board member.

 

Alice Johnson is a licensed practical nurse (LPN). On April 9, 2012, Letroy Gathen, who was Executive Director of Support Services for the Blytheville School District, called her and told her the District had a position open for an LPN and asked if she would like to interview for the job the next day. According to Johnson, Gathen promised her she would get the job and told her the salary would be $29,330 a year. At the time, she was employed as an LPN by Gosnell Therapy Center and was paid $17 an hour, 40 hours a week. Johnson alleged she resigned her position with Gosnell in reliance upon Gathen’s promise of employment. She met with Gathen on April 10, 2012, and she claimed he told her she was being hired for the LPN position at two Blytheville schools. She filled out insurance forms and was fingerprinted. In addition, she alleged her hiring was confirmed by a man named Mr. White. She did not know his first name.

 

Johnson alleged that on April 11, 2012, she reported at 7:45 a.m. to begin her training with the school nurse, Melissa Hess. Acting under Hess’s direction, Johnson gave students their morning medications; she and Hess then went to the Charter School and met the rest of the staff; Hess explained policies and procedures regarding automatic electrical devices; and Johnson gave Charter School students their noon and afternoon medications; she left work at 3:00 p.m. The next day, she returned to work and worked until 10:00 a.m. when Sandy Hughey, an assistant superintendent, told Johnson not to return to the school campus and asked her to sign papers without allowing her to read them.

 

Based on these allegations, Johnson filed suit against the District asserting claims for breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, and constructive fraud. The  District answered the complaint and moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court dismissed Johnson’s complaint on December 10, 2015. Johnson appealed.

 

On appeal, the Court clarified that Johnson asserted one basic argument divided into several subpoints. The overarching issue was whether statutory and constitutional law preempted the Blytheville School Board’s exclusive right to contract because of the Board’s agent’s, Gathen, conduct and Johnson’s reliance thereon. As part of that overall argument, she further contended: 1) Gathen bargained with Johnson with unclean hands because of his knowledge he did not have authority to contract with Johnson; 2) Johnson’s reliance on Gathen’s promise of employment, the resignation of her present employment, the filling out of forms, fingerprinting, and working one and one-half days constituted promissory estoppel; and 3) the court’s interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-620 et seq., under the facts that only Johnson was presumed to know the law, created an anomaly in the law with grievous consequences, an injustice.

 

The Court explained that the exclusive power to enter into initial written employment contracts on behalf of a school district with district employees, not including day-to-day substitutes, lies with the district’s board of directors. Moreover, the written employment contract must comply with statutory requirements. Here, the Court pointed out that there was no written contract between Johnson and the Blytheville School District. She did not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of her breach-of-contract claim. Instead, she relied upon the theories of promissory estoppel and constructive fraud.

 

Under promissory estoppel, as noted by Johnson, a “promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character” and which “does influence such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.” She also defined constructive fraud as a “breach of a legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others.” Johnson acknowledged that promissory estoppel can be utilized only if the person asserting the theory “reasonably or justifiably relied” on the words or conduct of the person to be charged with promissory estoppel. In dismissing her claims based on these theories, the trial court concluded that her reliance was not reasonable because she was presumed to know the law and the extent of the authority of school officials with whom she dealt and that the law clearly provides such contracts must be in writing and entered into by the board of the school district. Johnson contended that the trial court erred in that conclusion, but the Court disagreed.

 

According to the Court, it well-established in Arkansas that a school district is not liable on a purported contract if it is not approved and ratified by the school board in the manner required by law, which is consistent with other governmental officials not being able to bind the State or its subdivisions beyond the extent of their actual authority. While the Court acknowledged Johnson’s anger about the situation was perfectly understandable, the trial court’s dismissal of these claims was well supported by case law and based on sound public-policy grounds.

 

Moreover, to the extent Johnson tried to bolster her argument with her allegations that she filled out personnel forms, was fingerprinted, and worked one and a half days, the Court did not find those assertions helpful. That is, in her complaint, which the Court must take as true, she alleged that Gathen called her on April 9, 2012, and told her an LPN position was available; that he wanted her to come in for an interview the next day; and that he promised her she would get the job. According to her complaint, she resigned from her position at Gosnell Therapy Center on that same day—before she went for the interview, before she filled out papers, and before she worked a day and a half. In other words, even taking her allegations as true, she resigned from her position based solely on Gathen letting her know a position was available, asking her to come in for an interview, and “promising” her she would get the job. Thus, regardless of what the law is and what she should know about the law, the Court stated that reliance on those slim facts as a solid basis for resigning from her position on April 9 did not support a claim for relief in Arkansas. Johnson’s remaining constitutional arguments were not properly preserved for appeal. Affirmed.