Jack Nelson Jones Professional Association
February 19-25, 2018
Martens v. Blasingame, 2018 Ark. App. 96 (February 7, 2018)
This appeal comes from the White County Circuit Court, honorable Craig Hannah presiding. This case concerns the termination of alimony payments.
Craig Martens and Melanie Martens Blasingame were married in May 1996 and divorced in January 2015. The parties agreed on several issues, which were set forth in the divorce decree. They agreed on child custody, visitation, and child support. They also agreed on property division; specifically, Blasingame was awarded sole ownership of the parties GMC Acadia and agreed to indemnify Martens from any and all indebtedness owed on the vehicle. Additionally, they agreed on alimony, and the decree awarded Blasingame “alimony” in the amount of $702.34 for 48 consecutive months – the exact amount and duration of the car payments on the Acadia.
After the decree was entered, Martens made only two spousal-support payments. Marten unilaterally ceased his alimony payments, believing Blasingame had begun cohabitating with her boyfriend in March 2015. In May 2015, Blasingame remarried. On December 15, 2016, the Office of Child Support Enforcement notified Martens that it would begin withholding past-due and future claims for child and spousal support from his wages. As a result, Martens filed a motion to clarify the divorce decree relating to alimony. Citing section 9-12-312 of the Arkansas Code, Martens argued that he no longer owed spousal support because his liability for alimony automatically ceased in March 2015 upon Blasingame’s cohabitation, or at the very latest, in May 2015 when she remarried.
At a hearing, Blasingame testified that the parties had entered into an agreement that Martens would pay her $702.34 for 48 consecutive months in periodic alimony, representing the remaining balance of car payments on the Acadia that she had been awarded. Martens agreed that the amount of spousal support was calculated based on the car payment, but that it was designated as “alimony” so that he could deduct it from his taxes and so it would automatically terminate if Blasingame remarried. Since Blasingame remarried, Martens took the position that his obligation to pay alimony terminated by operation of law. Blasingame acknowledged that the law terminates alimony upon remarriage, unless otherwise ordered. However, she understood that, because the “alimony” was calculated based on the remaining balance on the automobile loan, Martens was still required to make the payments under their agreement. Martens admitted that he was unaware that spousal support could continue after remarriage if the parties agreed.
The circuit court held that, although designated as alimony, the $702.34 was in actuality a payment pursuant to a property-settlement agreement reached by the parties. In so finding, the court noted that the “alimony” payments were derived from the amount owed on the vehicle. It also noted that the way the other property was divided in the divorce, along with Blasingame’s apparent lack of need at the time, further militated toward a finding of property settlement over alimony. As a result, the trial court refused to find that the payments were terminated upon Blasingame’s remarriage. Marten appealed.
On appeal, Martens first contended that the circuit court erred in characterizing the “alimony” payments in the divorce decree as a property-division settlement. The Court agreed, pointing to the clear and unambiguous language of the decree. Also, the parties both admitted that they had agreed that the payments were considered alimony. Thus, the Court concluded, the payments in the divorce decree were, in fact, alimony payments.
Martens next argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that the alimony payments were non-modifiable and in denying his request for termination of alimony by operation of law. Martens based his argument on section 9-12-312(a)(2) of the Arkansas Code, which states, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the liability for alimony shall automatically cease upon the earlier of,” among other things: remarriage of the alimony recipient; and an intimate, cohabitating relationship. The Court found that Martens and Blasingame reached an independent agreement for the payment of alimony.
The Court explained that there are two major types of agreements for the payment of alimony. The first is an independent contract, usually in writing, by which one spouse, in contemplation of the divorce, binds himself or herself to pay a fixed amount or fixed installments for the other spouse’s support. Even though such a contract is approved by the court and incorporated in the decree, it does not merge into the court’s award of alimony, and consequently, the recipient spouse can seek to enforce that contract as an independent cause of action. The second type of agreement is that by which the parties, without making a contract that is meant to confer upon the recipient spouse an independent cause of action, merely agree upon the amount the court by its decree should fix as alimony. This type of contract is usually less formal, and by its nature it merges in the divorce decree.
The Court also pointed out that the agreement did not need to be in writing to be considered a binding, independent contract of the first type. Here both parties admitted to an agreement regarding the payment of alimony. They both admitted that the alimony payments were designed to cover the remaining balance of the automobile loan. They further agreed to alimony payments of a designed sum for a designated period of time. The Court explained that section 9-13-312, which provides for the automatic termination of alimony when the receiving spouse remarries or cohabitates, does not apply to an agreement for the payment of alimony over a term of years, even when the decree does not specifically address the effect of remarriage or cohabitation on the alimony obligation. Instead, when the parties agree to alimony for a designated period of time, it follows that there has been an agreement as contemplated by section 9-12-312(a), such that the automatic-termination provision regarding remarriage or cohabitation is not applicable. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Marten’s request for termination of his alimony payments, noting, however, that, while the circuit court reached the correct result, it did so for the wrong reason. Affirmed.